Pay for performance and contractual choice: the case of general practitioners in England

Health Economics Review

Table 1 Description of the variables in the empirical models 2003-2007

Variable	Obs.	Mean	Std. dev.	Min.	Max.
Outcome variables:
Principal	171,212	0.82		0.00	1.00
Mobility (old doctors)	141,930	0.06		0.00	1.00
New doctors	171,212	0.17		0.00	1.00
Exit	171,212	0.06		0.00	1.00
FTE	171,212	90.77	17.93	11.00	100.00
Proportion total QOF	138,303	96.97	5.68	10.00	100.00
points
Independent variables:
Age	171,212	45.18	9.74	23.00	85.00
Female	171,212	0.42		0.00	1.00
Practice years	171,212	28.92	6.26	0.00	32.99
Total population	171,204	8.77	4.51	0.00	37.61
(/1,000)
LISI	170,930	11.23	7.41	0.00	90.00
Proportion female	171,212	4.23	1.26	0.00	33.33
65-74
Proportion female	171,212	4.62	1.73	0.00	16.10
75+
Proportion male	171,212	3.91	1.17	0.00	33.33
65-74
Proportion male	171,212	2.89	1.19	0.00	100.00
75+
Distance to the	171,212	8.76	16.32	0.01	390.33
best practice
Price shock	35,043	-1.41	3.74	-36.86	0

ISSN: 2191-1991