Table 5 First-differenced models with exogenous price shock (2005–2006)
From: Pay for performance and contractual choice: the case of general practitioners in England
Model I: | Model II: | |
|---|---|---|
Change in | Change in access | |
FTE | of new doctors | |
Price shock | 0.10*** | 0.001 |
(0.03) | (0.0005) | |
Change in distance to the | -0.05*** | 0.001 |
best practice | (0.01) | (0.0001) |
Change in total population | 0.40*** | -0.02*** |
(0.09) | (0.002) | |
Change in LISI | -0.01 | -0.002 |
(0.03) | (0.001) | |
Change in proportion female | 1.10** | 0.06*** |
65-74 | (0.50) | (0.02) |
Change in proportion female | -0.43 | 0.06*** |
75+ | (0.34) | (0.01) |
Change in proportion male | -0.03 | 0.01 |
65-74 | (0.49) | (0.01) |
Change in proportion male | -0.66 | -0.16 |
75+ | (0.63) | (0.02) |
Change in practice size | -0.16 | 0.03*** |
(0.11) | (0.003) | |
Constant | 3.45*** | -0.01*** |
(0.14) | (0.003) | |
N. observations | 34,954 | 25,905 |
N. practices | 8119 | 4756 |