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Table 3 Random pairing of consistent offers based on monotone preferences – mean of market outcomes

From: The impact of reimbursement negotiations on cost and availability of new pharmaceuticals: evidence from an online experiment

Round

Price group

Pairs

Trades possible based on monotone preferences

Successful trades based on consistent offers

Bonuses realized due to successful negotiation

number of trades

in percent of pairs

number of trades

in percent of pairs

regulators with bonus

average bonus in $ (for >0)

sellers with bonus

average bonus in $ (for >0)

total average bonus in $ (for >0)

1

100k$

41

22.0

 

53.6%

 

12.6

 

30.7%

6.8

 

0.22

 

8.2

 

0.09

 

0.15

 

1$

43

29.9

 

69.5%

b1

17.3

 

40.2%

10.6

 

0.17

 

12.7

 

0.17

b2

0.17

 

2

100k$

42

24.0

 

57.0%

 

14.7

b3

35.1%

7.9

 

0.41

 

9.5

 

0.12

 

0.25

 

1$

46

32.2

 

69.9%

b1,b4

20.0

 

43.5%

14.8

 

0.22

a1

15.5

 

0.17

b2

0.19

 

3

100k$

45

24.7

b5

54.8%

 

14.7

b3

32.6%

9.8

 

0.33

 

10.9

b6

0.15

 

0.23

 

1$

48

33.6

 

70.1%

b4

21.4

 

44.7%

15.6

 

0.23

a1

16.4

a2

0.20

a3

0.21

 

4

100k$

43

24.5

b5

57.0%

 

15.6

b7

36.3%

10.7

b8

0.36

b9

10.9

b6,b10

0.17

 

0.26

 

1$

46

30.7

 

66.8%

 

20.2

b11

43.9%

15.0

 

0.33

 

16.7

a2

0.20

a3

0.26

a4

5

100k$

44

23.3

 

52.9%

 

15.5

b7

35.2%

10.7

b8

0.36

b9

11.0

b10

0.19

 

0.27

 

1$

47

29.8

 

63.3%

 

20.3

b11

43.1%

16.1

 

0.29

 

16.3

 

0.24

 

0.27

a4

average

 

45

27

61%

17

39%

63% of trades possible

  1. 500 iterations (states of the society) for 10 markets (5 products in 2 price frames). Iterations are not correlated with the outcomes. Cases analysed are 5000 market states, not participants. There were no double entries to remove; each market state was unique
  2. Consistent price offers (<WTA or > WTP) excluded for each round separately, instead of excluding inconsistent players (one or more inconsistent offers) overall
  3. Rounds: Independent sample t-test between rounds (consecutive, controlled for price group) significantly different at p < 0.01 for all columns, except pairs marked with letter “a” (p < 0.05) and “b” (not significant)
  4. Price groups: Independent sample t-test between price groups for all rounds significantly different at p < 0.01 for all columns, except total bonus realized in round 5 p < 0.05, in round 4 not significant
  5. Trades successful: Paired sample t-test (one-tailed) for same iteration significant for differences between trades possible vs. successful trades (p < 0.01)
  6. Roles: Paired sample t-test for same iteration significant for differences between roles regarding number of players with positive bonus (p < 0.01, except for 100 k$ round 4 p < 0.05; not significant for 1$ round 5) and average bonus for players with bonus (p < 0.01, except not significant for 1$ round 1)
  7. The number of unique combinations in each market is high (e.g. for round 1 of 100 k$: 43!/(43–41)!). We increased the number of iterations up to a point where the variables of interest were not significantly different anymore between two runs with the same iteration size and the difference of average trades possible and trades successful (in percent of pairs) between the runs were stable at 0.1%